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DUE PROCESS AND THE PAROLE RELEASE
DECISION
INTRODUCTION
Even a prisoner who has been deprived of his liberty by
due process of law continues to be protected by the Constitu-
tion.' The extent to which prisoners' rights are constitutionally
protected, however, is an area of the law which is still evolving.
Although recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court
have extended due process into the areas of parole revocation'
and inmate disciplinary proceedings, 3 the controversy has since
focused upon whether due process should apply to parole re-
lease proceedings. The Court's latest attempt at resolving this
issue is Scott v. Kentucky Parole Board.4
In Scott the prisoner filed a class action in federal district
court on behalf of all inmates subject to the jurisdiction of the
Kentucky Parole Board.' The action challenged the constitu-
tionality of the state board's parole release proceedings on the
grounds that they were conducted without minimum proce-
dural safeguards. The opinion of the district court, holding that
the prisoner was not entitled to due process protection in parole
release proceedings, was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit. The United States Supreme Court subse-
quently granted certiorari. Since petitioner Scott was released
on parole during the action,6 the Court vacated the order after
I "But though his rights may be diminished by the needs and exigencies of the
institutional environment, a prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protec-
tions when he is imprisoned for crime. There is no iron curtain drawn between the
Constitution and the prisons of this country." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-
56 (1974).
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
429 U.S. 60 (1976), vacating and remanding for consideration of mootness per
curiam Bell v. Kentucky Parole Bd., No. 74-1899 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1975), aff'g mem.
(E.D. Ky., filed Mar. 15, 1974).
- Although the action was never certified as a class action, it was treated as such
by the district court and the court of appeals. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 17, Scott
v. Kentucky Parole Bd., 429 U.S. 60 (1976).
6 The other named petitioner, Calvin Bell, had been released on parole and subse-
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hearing oral argument and remanded the case to the court of
appeals to consider the question of mootness.
The Supreme Court has been faced with the problem of
mootness several times in attempting to decide whether due
process applies to the parole release decision. 7 The issue ap-
pears to be one that is "capable of repetition, yet evading re-
view."8 As Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent in Scott,9
the issue demands the Court's resolution in view of the great
number of parole release decisions each year, the significance
of the decision to the prisoner, and the increasing amount of
litigation and conflicting decisions in the federal courts."0
quently died. Brief for Petitioner at 5 n.1, Scott v. Kentucky Parole Bd., 429 U.S. 60
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Petitioner].
I Other cases evading the Court's review because of mootness include: Bradford
v. Weinstein, 519 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1974), vacated as moot, 423 U.S. 147 (1975);
United State& ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925
(2d Cir.), vacated as moot sub nom. Regan v. Johnson, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974); Scarpa
v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278 (5th Cir.), vacated and remanded for
consideration of mootness, 414 U.S. 809 (1973), dismissed as moot, 501 F.2d 992 (5th
Cir. 1973).
8 Scott v. Kentucky Parole Bd., 429 U.S. 60, 63-64 (1976) (Stevens, J. joined by
Brennan and Powell, JJ., dissenting). If a petitioner is not permitted to bring a class
action because of lack of certification, see note 5, supra, review is still possible under
the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" doctrine. The Court in Weinstein v.
Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975), noted that an issue will not be held moot if the
challenged action has too short a duration to be fully litigated before expiration and
there is a reasonable expectation that the same party will be subjected to the action
again.
In Scott both requirements are met. The petitioner remains a parolee and, in view
of the fact noted in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479 (1972), that 35%-45% of all
paroles are revoked, Scott has a reasonable expectation of parole revocation and subse-
quent application for a release before the same parole board. Furthermore, since Scott
claims he would not presently be subject to "close parole supervision" if he had re-
ceived due process rights during his parole release proceedings, he has a "direct and
immediate interest." 429 U.S. 60, 63 (dissenting opinion).
429 U.S. at 61 (dissenting opinion).
10 Since Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), and Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539 (1974), several federal courts have held that due process applies at least to
the extent that reasons must be given for denial of parole. See generally United States
ex rel. Richerson v. Wolff, 525 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 914
(1976); Bradford v. Weinstein, 519 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1974), vacated as moot, 423 U.S.
147 (1975); Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Mower v. Britton, 504 F.2d 396 (10th Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Johnson v.
Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot sub
nom. Regan v. Johnson, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974); Franklin v. Shields, 399 F. Supp. 309
(W.D. Va. 1975); Billiteri v. United States Bd. of Parole, 385 F. Supp. 1217 (W.D.N.Y.
1974); Cooley v. Sigler, 381 F. Supp. 441 (D. Minn. 1974); Candarini v. Attorney
General, 369 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
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Whether the Court has the opportunity to decide Scott or sub-
sequently is presented a similar case, it will be faced with two
questions: (1) does procedural due process apply to parole re-
lease proceedings? and (2) if so, what minimum procedures are
required?"
I. THE PRISONER'S INTEREST IN DUE PROCESS
Before due process can be held to apply to parole release
proceedings, the prisoner must be considered to have a consti-
tutionally protected interest in receiving parole. Two Supreme
Court decisions are important in interpreting the nature of the
prisoner's interest in parole release. In Morrissey v. Brewer2
the Court held that an individual already released on parole
has sufficient interest in keeping his "conditional liberty" so as
to require due process in parole revocation proceedings. 3 Wolff
v. McDonnell" dealt more directly with inmates' rights, requir-
ing due process before a prisoner's good-time credits5 may be
revoked in a disciplinary proceeding. These recent extensions
of due process into the areas of parole revocation and inmate
disciplinary proceedings urge a reconsideration of the tradi-
tional concepts regarding the nature of the prisoner's interest
in parole release."6
But see Brown v. Lundgren, 528 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 917
(1976). For earlier cases holding that due process is inapplicable, see Scarpa v. United
States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278 (5th Cir.), vacated and remanded for consideration
of mootness, 414 U.S. 809 (1973), dismissed as moot, 501 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1973);
Mosley v. Ashby, 459 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1972); Dorado v. Kerr, 454 F.2d 892 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972); Barnes v. United States, 445 F.2d 260 (8th Cir. 1971);
Madden v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 438 F.2d 1189 (3d Cir. 1971); Schawartzberg
v. United States Bd. of Parole, 399 F.2d 297 (10th Cir.1968).
" Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 4.
22 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
11 See also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), in which the Court held that
due process guarantees similar to those in Morrissey are also required before probation
is revoked.
" 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
25 Good-time credits are reductions of the prisoner's term of sentence, awarded for
good behavior and subject to forfeiture as a sanction for serious misconduct. Id. at 546
n.6.
Is With the exceptions of the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, all of the courts of appeals
whict have considered the issue since Wolff have held that due process applies to some
extent in the parole release decision. See note 10 supra, for a listing of such cases.
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A. Background of Morrissey and Wolff
One argument against applying due process in parole re-
lease is the "present enjoyment" rationale-the idea that a
prisoner does not possess liberty and therefore is not deprived
of it when parole is denied. 7 Admittedly, a parolee's interest
in due process would be greater than that of a prisoner applying
for parole in that the parolee already enjoys freedom, even
though it is restricted.1 Yet had the Court applied the "present
enjoyment" rationale in Wolff, due process safeguards could
not have been extended to disciplinary proceedings. Loss of
good time, like denial of parole, lengthens the actual period of
imprisonment although it does not affect the inmate's present
freedom."
Another argument is that the "right-privilege" distinction
prevents the application of due process in the parole release
proceeding. The "right-privilege" theory holds that application
of due process depends upon whether a governmental benefit
is characterized as an absolute "right" or a mere "privilege." ' 0
However, the "right-privilege" theory has been rejected
soundly by the Court.2' Instead, the test today is whether the
individual is "condemned to suffer grievous loss" because of
the absence of due process. 2 Under this requirement, whether
" Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278, 282 (5th Cir. 1973). The
"present enjoyment" rationale has been attacked in Bradford v. Weinstein, 519 F.2d
728, 731-32 (4th Cir. 1974), and in Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270,
1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
1S "It is not sophistic to attach greater importance to a person's justifiable reliance
on maintaining his conditional freedom . . . than to his mere anticipation or hope of
freedom." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 482 n.8 (quoting United States ex rel Bey
v. Connecticut Bd. of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079, 1086 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 404 U.S.
879 (1971)).
19 Note, Procedural Due Process in Parole Release Proceedings- Existing Rules,
Recent Court Decisions, and Experience in Prison, 60 MNN. L. REv. 341, 346 (1976).
The Supreme Court has applied procedural safeguards to several proceedings in
which applicants did not presently enjoy benefits. See, e.g., Willner v. Committee on
Character, 373 U.S. 96 (1963), and Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232
(1957) (denial of admission to state bar); Goldsmith v. United States Bd. of Tax
Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926) (denial of admission to practice before the Board of Tax
Appeals).
See Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), afl'd, 341 U.S. 918
(1951).
22 See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972); Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971).
22 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refu-
gee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
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the prisoner suffers a "grievous loss" upon denial of parole does
not depend upon the gravity of the loss, but rather upon its
nature3--whether the prisoner's interest is one involving lib-




The Constitution guarantees that no one will be deprived
of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
"Liberty" has been construed broadly to mean more than mere
freedom from physical restraint."8 The Court in Morrissey held
that a parolee's interest in retaining his conditional liberty
requires due process safeguards in the revocation proceedings.
However, the result of parole revocation and the result of parole
denial are identical: incarceration or conditional liberty.s It
would seem, therefore, that the prisoner applying for parole
would be entitled to the same due process rights as the parolee
faced with revocation.
A comparison with the situation in Wolff is even more
convincing, for the parole applicant's interest in liberty is at
least as strong as that of the prisoner who may be deprived of
" Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
24 "The Board holds the key to the lock of the prison. It possesses the power to
grant or to deny conditional liberty . . . .The result of the Board's exercise of its
discretion is that an applicant either suffers a 'grievous loss' or gains a conditional
liberty." Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
But see Brown v. Lundgren, 528 F.2d 1050, 1053 (5th Cir. 1976) (loss of mere expecta-
tion of release is not a "grievous loss").
2 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
2, The Supreme Court stated:
Without doubt it [liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily re-
straint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of
the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, es-
tablish a home and bring up children . . . , and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized . . . as essential t6 the orderly pursuit of happi-
ness by free men.
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972)(failure to renew nontenured
teacher's contract held not to be deprivation of liberty or property in particular in-
stance) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
11 "To hold otherwise would be to create a distinction too gossamer-thin to stand
close analysis. Whether the immediate issue be release or revocation, the stakes are
the same: conditional freedom versus incarceration." United States ex reL. Johnson v.
Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925, 928 (2d Cir. 1974).
" Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 33-34. Accord, Childs v. United States Bd.
of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270, 1277-78 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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good-time credits. In each instance there is no immediate loss
or change in status either upon denial of parole or upon forfei-
ture of good time. Yet both actions result in extending the
length of imprisonment. The prisoner who is denied parole suf-
fers an additional deprivation of liberty; whereas good time can
be restored to the inmate, the prisoner initially denied parole
may be forced to wait several years before his application is
again considered.29
C. Property
"To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly
must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must
have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, in-
stead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement . . . ."I The
prisoner's "legitimate claim of entitlement" to parole may be
found in the statutory right to be considered for parole." The
Supreme Court in Wolff found that the inmate's interest in
statutorily created good-time credits had "real substance" and
was therefore entitled to protection under due process.2
The parole applicant derives an additional property inter-
est in that he has a reasonable expectation of parole release.
This is a justifiable expectation based upon the integral part
parole plays in the penological system34 and upon the large
" Note, supra note 19, at 347.
The Kentucky Parole Board is required to make an initial review of parole release
within specified times. Any further reviews are made at the discretion of the Board.
501 Ky. ADMIN. REG. 1:010 §§ 1-4 (1976). Therefore the prisoner who is denied parole
may have to wait indefinitely for a second review.
See also Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 4208(h)(Supp.
1977). Under the new act federal prisoners serving terms of 7 years or less are entitled
to subsequent hearings every 18 months after the initial denial of parole; those with
terms longer than 7 years are entitled to hearings every 24 months.
30 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
"' Bradford v. Weinstein, 519 F.2d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1974), vacated as moot, 423
U.S. 147 (1975). See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 439.330,.340 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
KRS].
32 418 U.S. at 557.
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution.
Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules
or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support
claims of entitlement to those benefits.
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
31 "[Wihere the federal government has made parole an integral part of the
COMMENTS
number of inmates released on parole each year. 5 Recent stud-
ies show that seventy-two percent of those felons released from
prisons in 1970 were released on parole.38 In 1974 and 1975, of
the 2,676 inmates interviewed by the Kentucky Parole Board,
1,410 were granted parole.17 The prisoner applying for parole
thus has a justifiable expectation that the parole board will not
arbitrarily deny parole if his prison record shows him to be
sufficiently rehabilitated. 8
II. THE PROCESS THAT Is DUE
A. The Balancing Analysis
If due process is held to apply to parole release proceed-
ings, the next step would be to decide what procedural safe-
guards are necessary. The most restrictive approach is to limit
the prisoner's protections to those set out in the statute grant-
ing the right to consideration of parole. 9 However, parole stat-
utes often place such broad discretion in the parole board that
there are no legally enforceable safeguards." Therefore, once
the prisoner is held to have a protected interest in parole, the
procedures governing denial must be measured not by statu-
tory definitions, but by constitutional standards that guaran-
penological system, I believe it is also essential that authority to deny parole not be
arbitrarily exercised." Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270, 1280 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
1 In United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 500
F.2d 925, 928 (2d Cir. 1974), the court partially based its extension of due process to
the parole applicant on the fact that the average prisoner has a better than 50% chance
of being paroled before the expiration of his sentence.
1' Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 23.
31 Id. at 24 (quoting OFFICE OF STATISTICAL INFORMATION, KENTUCKY BURAU OF
CORRECTIONS, PAROLE BOARD AcTrmTIEs, 1951-74).
3 The Supreme Court in Morrissey recognized a similar reliance: "The parolee has
relied on at least an implicit promise that parole will be revoked only if he fails to live
up to the parole conditions." 408 U.S. at 482.
', This approach was approved by the court in Brown v. Lundgren, 528 F.2d 1050
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 917 (1976). See also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134,
153-54 (1974) (plurality opinion) (due process requirements in termination of civil
service employment), in which the Court stated "[W]here the grant of a substantive
right is inextricably intertwined with the limitations on the procedures which are to
be employed in determining that right, a litigant . . . must take the bitter with the
sweet."
0 O'Leary & Nuffield, Parole Decision-Making Characteristics: Report of a Na-
tional Survey, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 651, 660 (1972).
1977]
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tee fairness and rationality."
The determination of what procedural safeguards are re-
quired in parole release proceedings must rest on a balancing
of the state's interests against those of the prisoner.42 The
state's primary interests in the parole release decision are to
ensure efficient administration and use of accurate and rele-
vant information as the basis of the decisions and to promote
rehabilitation by creating fairness in the process, thereby re-
lieving inmate hostility and frustration.13 Obviously, the pris-
oner's interests are furthered by the elements of fairness and
accuracy in the process." The conflict of interest lies in the
state's desire for speed and efficiency. Although decreasing the
administrative burden is a legitimate state interest, it cannot
override a constitutionally protected right. 5 When a parole
board hears as many as forty cases a day, thereby allowing an
average of only seven or eight minutes per hearing, it is clear
that speed is the main concern.46
The Supreme Court considered this increased administra-
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 166-67 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part
and concurring in result in part).
42 "[Clonsideration of what procedures due process may require under any given
set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the
government function involved as well as the private interest that has been affected by
governmental action." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481 (1972) (quoting Cafeteria
& Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).
11 Project, Parole Release Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE
L.J. 810, 850 (1975).
1 An economic analysis reveals further merging of state and individual interests
in releasing prisoners on parole as soon as feasible. Not only is the actual incarceration
expensive to the state, but the individual's contributions to his community are lost.
The state must bear the loss of income that the inmate would have earned on parole
by supporting those dependent on him. Merritt, Due Process in Parole Granting: A
Current Assessment, 10 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 93, 98-99 & nn.25 & 27 (1976).
45 "[TIhe Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency."
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90-91 n.22 (1972) (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 656 (1972)).
11 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 55. A similar situation in the New York
system was denounced by the court in United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of
N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925, 931-32 (2d Cir. 1974). In that case the court
noted that the average time per hearing-including initial reading of the file, inter-
view, and decision-was 5.9 minutes. Furthermore, only one of the three members of
the parole board actually read the file. The other two summarily acquiesced in the
reviewing member's decision.
See also O'Leary & Nuffield, supra note 40, at 658, for a survey of the number of
cases heard per day by parole boards in the United States. They list 13 jurisdictions
as hearing 40 or more cases each day.
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tive burden justified in parole revocation and disciplinary pro-
ceedings. Although there are some differences between the pa-
role revocation and release processes, the similarities are more
significant in that both involve factfinding, prediction and dis-
cretion within the decision-making process, and both entail the
same interest in conditional liberty.47 Following a balancing
analysis, 8 the Supreme Court in Morrissey held that the paro-
lee is entitled to the following procedural safeguards before his
parole can be revoked: (1) prior written notice of the alleged
parole violations and disclosure of the evidence to be used
against him; (2) opportunity to appear and present witnesses
and documentary evidence before a neutral body; (3) oppor-
tunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, unless
there is good cause shown to restrict this right; and (4) right to
a written statement revealing the evidence relied upon and the
reasons for revocation. 9 The Morrissey Court placed particular
emphasis on the need for procedures that would ensure flexibil-
ity, as well as accurate factfinding.5 ° However, they made it
clear that the full range of due process rights attaching to ad-
versary criminal proceedings are not required where
"conditional liberty" is involved.51 The particular procedures
required must be tailored to fit the nature of the individual
proceeding.
B. Prior Notice and Access to Evidence
The most fundamental procedural safeguard is the oppor-
tunity for the parole applicant to know in advance what mate-
rial the parole board will rely upon in making its determina-
tion. Without prior access to his file, a prisoner is incapable of
, Project, supra note 43, at 852.
' There are two related analyses in determining what procedures are necessary
in the parole release process. The primary theory is the "grievous loss" analysis, which
requires first an interest protected by due process, a deprivation amounting to a
"grievous loss," and then a balancing of the interests involved. The "potential error"
analysis, on the other hand, begins by balancing interests. The risk of potential error
and resulting harm serves to strengthen or justify application of due process to the
government action and to determine what procedures are necessary. Merritt, supra
note 44, at 97 n.22.
1' 408 U.S. at 489. The same procedures apply to probation revocation procedures.
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 783 (1973).
408 U.S. at 488, 489.
Id. at 480.
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effectively rebutting adverse evidence. Thus, mere notice that
a parole review will be held is meaningless.
52
The prisoner who has appeared before the Kentucky Pa-
role Board may have no idea of what information the board
relied upon in its decision. There is no organized method of
collecting information for the file,53 no check on the accuracy
of the material, and thus no possible way for the applicant to
rebut false or incomplete information.54 In such a situation, the
risk that the board will rely on erroneous data in denying parole
is substantial. 5 Prior access to his file would allow the parole
applicant to submit documented evidence rebutting false infor-
mation and supplying omitted relevant material. Such access
would also permit the applicant to point out any constitution-
"2 The United States Parole Commission is required to give notice and to allow
access to the parole applicant's files at least 30 days before the hearing. Parole Com-
mission and Reorganization Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 4208(b) (Supp. 1977).
S[The bureau of corrections shall obtain all pertinent information
regarding each prisoner . . . . Such information shall include his criminal
record, his conduct, employment and attitude in prison, and the reports of
such physical and mental examinations as have been made. The bureau of
corrections shall furnish the circumstances of his offense and his previous
social history to the institution and the board. . . and shall prepare a report
on such information as it obtains. It shall be the duty of the bureau of
corrections to supplement this report with such material as the board may
request and submit such report to the board.
KRS § 439.340(1) (1975) (emphasis added).
11 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 11.
5 Present practices and procedures do not provide reasonable assurance
that the Board's decisions on applications for parole will be based upon
reasonably reliable determinations of fact. In fact, under present Parole
Board practices and procedures, there exists a substantial danger of deci-
sions which are based upon clearly erroneous assumptions of fact.
• . .The sources of said danger of error include evidence of filing errors
and omissions, confusion stemming from instances of mistaken identity;
possible reliance upon outdated and superseded information; reliance upon
unsubstantiated assertions; reliance upon conflicting, unclear, and in some
instances not apparently reliable psychological testing data and similar in-
formation; and the like.
Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 371 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (D.D.C. 1973), affd,
511 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See, e.g., Leonard v. Mississippi State Probation &
Parole Bd., 509 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1975) (use of prison disciplinary records obtained in
proceedings that were constitutionally impermissible); Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116
(D. C. Cir. 1974) (entries of arrests based on violation of constitutional rights); Frank-
lin v. Shields, 399 F. Supp. 309 (W.D. Va. 1975) (finding of fact that Virginia Parole
Board relies on erroneous information that has never been verified); Kohlman v. Nor-
ton, 380 F. Supp. 1073 (D. Conn. 1974) (parole denied; file erroneously indicated use
of gun by applicant during robbery).
COMMENTS
ally impermissible material included in the file." This updat-
ing of the file would not only save time during the subsequent
hearing, but would also prevent any prior misconceptions the
board might entertain upon an initial reading of the file.5
Of course there may be information which the board does
not wish to reveal to the inmate. The United States Parole
Commission guidelines provide that the Commission must fur-
nish a summary of the information in the file. However, the
summary may be limited in cases where the information would
disrupt the prisoner's rehabilitation program, where the infor-
mation was obtained through a promise of confidentiality, or
where disclosure would harm an individual. 8 Yet even with
these restrictions on disclosure, the primary goal of "accurate
finding of fact and informed use of discretion" will be ad-
vanced.59 Furthermore, the board will have a more reliable
basis on which to predict the applicant's ability to function
outside of prison.6"
C. Prior Submission of Written Statement and Rebuttal at
Hearing
The present procedure of the Kentucky Parole Board al-
lows the applicant to speak and ask questions during the inter-
view, but not to present argument or evidence. Because of this
procedure, the prisoner can do little to change any unfavorable
impression that may have been created from a reading of his
file. However, if he is allowed to submit a written statement for
the board to read initially with his file and is allowed to explain
or rebut before the board any adverse information contained
therein, the limited time available for the interview would be
used more advantageously. The emphasis would be on the writ-
ten record, with oral testimony made largely unnecessary.
2
Merritt, supra note 44, at 102 n.46, 103.
" Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 56.
" Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 4208(c) (Supp.
1977).
' Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 785 (1973).
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 45.
" Id. at 10. In 1972, 17 jurisdictions allowed the applicant to present witnesses
before the parole board; 34 did not. O'Leary & Nuffield, supra note 40, at 658.
2 Merritt, supra note 44, at 102.
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The parolee faced with parole revocation has a right to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses during his hear-
ing. 3 On the other hand, the inmate has no such right in disci-
plinary proceedings. 4 There are several arguments against al-
lowing confrontation and cross-examination in a parole release
hearing. First, it has been argued that since the proceeding is
predictive and nonaccusatory in nature, there is no need for a
cross-examination. 5 Furthermore, some argue that since the
prisoner already has the opportunity to submit favorable infor-
mation, confrontation and cross-examination would have only
a minor advantage. Although these arguments do have a rea-
sonable basis in the ordinary case, confrontation and cross-
examination should be allowed in those cases where there are
material factual. disputes and no security or safety problems."
D. Written Reasons for Denial of Parole
Even if the parole applicant were given all the protections
of full adversary hearing, these safeguards would mean little
without the requirement that parole boards give written rea-
sons for denial of parole. 8 The majority of jurisdictions do not
require the parole board to inform the prisoner of the reasons
This right to confrontation and cross-examination during the revocation hearing
is curtailed when "good cause," such as a security problem, is shown. Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
6 In Wolff the Court recognized the right of the inmate to call witnesses and to
present documentary evidence unless the disciplinary committee showed good reason
not to allow it. However, the right of confrontation and cross-examination was consid-
ered unnecessary, since the proceeding did not constitute a criminal trial involving a
serious deprivation. 418 U.S. at 566-67. Another reason for refusing to allow confronta-
tion was the possibility of retaliation against informing inmates and guards. Id. at 562.
But see the opinions of Mr. Justice Marshall and Mr. Justice Douglas, in which they
argue in favor of giving the inmate the rights of cross-examination and confrontation.
418 U.S. at 585-86 (concurring in part and dissenting in part), 595-97 (dissenting in
part and concurring in the result in part).
Is There is no provision for confrontation or cross-examination by the applicant
before the United States Parole Commission. Parole Commission and Reorganization
Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 4208 (Supp. 1977).
6 Brief for Respondent at 30, Scott v. Kentucky Parole Bd., 429 U.S. 60 (1976).
67 Merritt, supra note 44, at 102 n.46.
11 "The heart of the matter is that democracy implies respect for the elementary
rights of men, however suspect or unworthy; a democratic government must therefore
practice fairness; and fairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determina-
tion of facts decisive of rights." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123, 170 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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for denying his application. 9 In Kentucky there is no summary
or verbatim record of the hearing." The board orally announces
its decision after deliberation. There is no requirement, nor is
it common, for the board to inform the prisoner why he is being
denied parole, nor what he can do to improve his chances for
future parole.'
In this area the state's rationale again is that the require-
ment of written reasons would be too burdensome. "The short
answer to that argument is that it is not burdensome to give
reasons when reasons exist. 7 2 On the other hand, there are
many purposes that can be served merely by giving the prisoner
a written statement as to the basis of the board's decisions. The
primary advantage would be to force the parole board to be
rational in denying parole. 71 By making its reasons public, the
parole board would be forced to consider only relevant, consti-
tutionally permissible material and to make principled deci-
sions.7
Requiring written reasons would also facilitate judicial
review.75 Faced with the almost total discretion of the parole
board, the prisoner has nothing on which to base an appeal.
The'board should furnish not only the factual grounds for de-
nial, but also the specific evidentiary bases relied upon. Ex-
haustive detail would not be required, but instead merely
enough specificity to allow an appellate body to determine
whether there has been an abuse of discretion.
76
" The results of the 1973 survey by O'Leary & Nuffield, supra note 40, at 658,
show that only 11 of the 54 jurisdictions provide written reasons for denial of parole.
10 Twenty of the 54 jurisdictions surveyed keep a verbatim record of the parole
release hearing. Id.
11 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 11. The Kentucky Supreme Court has left
the matter of giving written reasons for decisions to the state parole board as an
administrative policy decision, deferring to the board's discretion in making predic-
tions about future inmate behavior. Harrison v. Robuck, 508 S.W.2d 767, 768 (Ky.
1974).
72 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 591 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
73 "[T]he provision for a written record helps insure that administrators, faced
with possible scrutiny by state officials and the public, and perhaps even the courts,
where fundamental constitutional rights may have been abridged, will act fairly."
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 565 (1974).
1' United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d
925, 931 (2d Cir. 1974).
11 Id. at 929.
1, To satisfy due process requirements a statement of reasons should be
sufficient to enable a reviewing body to determine whether parole has been
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Specific written bases for denial of parole would serve a
rehabilitative function by relieving inmates' frustrations and
bitterness at the apparent arbitrariness of the release deci-
sion.Y Equally important is the fact that the prisoner would
have some guidance as to how to modify his behavior and im-
prove his chances for parole.7 8 Articulated reasons for denial
may also lead to a consistent system of precedent and rules
that would aid the courts in initial sentencing and provide a
basis for improvements within the penological system.79
E. Right to Counsel
At present no jurisdiction recognizes a right to appointed
denied for an impermissible reason or for no reason at all. For this essential
purpose, detailed findings of fact are not required, provided. . . it furnishes
to the inmate both the grounds for the decision (e.g., that in its view the
prisoner would, if released, probably engage in criminal activity) and the
essential facts upon which the Board's inferences are based (e.g., the pris-
oner's long record, prior experience on parole, lack of a parole plan, lack of
employment skills or of prospective employment and housing, and his drug
addiction).
Id. at 934.
The United States Parole Commission is required to give written reasons for denial
such as: failure to follow prison rules; possibility that release would engender public
disrespect for law or the gravity of the offense; danger to public welfare. In lieu of, or
in addition to the reasons for denial, the Commission may furnish the prisoner with
the guideline evaluation statement and any other specific facts relied upon. 28 C.F.R.
§ 2.13(c) (1976).
7 The prisoner then returns to prison routine and awaits the decision
in a state of anguish.
To be denied parole is frustrating. But to be denied parole without any
explanation for the decision is embittering and rancorous.
Because no rationale is given, the prisoner, comparing his case to that
of others who were granted parole, may see the denial as a capricious deci-
sion. He is often at a loss to understand what he has done wrong or how he
can improve his performance. Parole board silence compounds his cynicism
and his hostility to authority.
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, PAROLE DECISIONS (1972) (policy state-
ment approved by Council's Board of Directors on Oct. 31, 1972), quoted in Merritt,
supra note 44, at 106 n.62.
" United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d
925, 932 (2d Cir. 1974).
The Kentucky Parole Board's reason for denying petitioner Scott parole was that
he would "need more time to get together." Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 12.
Such a vague statement is meaningless and frustrating to the denied applicant and of
no aid to a reviewing body. Id. at 68.
"' United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d
925, 933 (2d Cir. 1974).
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counsel for the indigent parole applicant. 8 Twenty-one juris-
dictions allow the presence of retained counsel during the hear-
ing; thirty do not.8' Yet a real need for some kind of legal
assistance during the release proceedings is often obvious.
Many inmates have little education and limited intelligence;
2
thus the aid of an attorney or law student would be helpful in
examining the prisoner's file for improperly included informa-
tion and in obtaining relevant material outside of prison. Fur-
thermore, the mere presence of an advocate would serve as
some restraint on biased or arbitrary board actions during the
hearing. 3
The Supreme Court in Morrissey specifically refused to
decide whether the indigent parolee has a right either to re-
tained or appointed counsel during revocation proceedings.84
Those opposing interjection of counsel into the, parole release
decision fear increased costs and delays and the limitation of
the board's necessary discretion in making predictions. It is
feared that the presence of counsel might change the board's
predictive, rehabilitative function into one that has a less toler-
ant, factfinding focus. 5
The United States Parole Commission allows the parole
applicant to consult retained counsel before the release hear-
ing"8 and to provide himself with a representative during the
interview. However, the function of the representative during
the hearing is limited to furnishing any additional information
the panel might request and making a concluding statement.
87
Therefore the limited function of counsel during the interview
would not significantly change the nature of the board's inquiry
nor restrict the board's discretion. However, the indigent pa-
role appli6ant has no right to appointed counsel in the federal
O'Leary & Nuffield, supra note 40, at 659.
Id. at 658.
32 See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 487 (1969).
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 59-60.
" 408 U.S. at 489 (1972). But see Justice Brennan's concurring opinion joined by
Justice Marshall, stating that the parolee should have the right to retained counsel but
that the right of appointed counsel should remain an open question. Id. at 491.
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787-88 (1973).
" Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 4208(d) (1) (Supp.
1977).
91 28 C.F.R. § 2.12(b) (1976).
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parole system88 and is thus barred from receiving the same
benefits wealthier prisoners can afford.89
Another way to strike a balance between the competing
interests is the Supreme Court's approach in probation and
parole revocation proceedings. In Gagnon v. Scarpelli,° de-
cided after Morrissey, the Court leaned in favor of permitting
the revocation board to decide on a case-by-case basis whether
counsel should be appointed for the indigent probationer or
parolee." The Court set forth a two-step procedure. First, the
individual facing revocation proceedings must make a timely
request for appointed counsel based on either a denial of the
alleged parole or probation violation, or the presence of com-
plex mitigating circumstances that would be difficult to pres-
ent. The revocation board then considers whether the individ-
ual is capable of effectively representing himself. The board
must state its grounds for denying the request for counsel.2 The
Gagnon approach eliminates the problem of an unnecessary
state burden by refusing to appoint counsel when it is not re-
quired, as when the individual admits violation of probation or
parole or the evidence is easy to present. 3
Thus if the Court's approach in Gagnon were implemented
in the parole release decision, the applicant would be allowed
to have full representation by retained or appointed counsel
only if the parole board considered it necessary in the particu-
lar case;94 there would still be no broad right to counsel in every
case 9 5 Since the presence of counsel would be determined ac-
" The Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 4208(d) (1), (2)
(Supp. 1977), allows the prisoner to consult with a representative before the hearing
and to be represented at the parole hearing. There isno provision for appointed counsel
in the act.
9 The major case involving discrimination on the basis of wealth is San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
411 U.S. 778 (1973).
" The Morrissey Court had left open the question of whether the indigent parolee
facing parole revocation has any right to counsel, either retained or appointed. 408 U.S.
at 489.
92 411 U.S. at 791-92.
Id. at 788.
" In Gagnon the Court describes the situations in which counsel must be ap-
pointed for the indigent parolee or probationer, but does not decide whether counsel
may be retained in the other cases where appointed counsel would not be considered
necessary. Id. at 784 n.6.
11 The Supreme Court in Wolff also held that the inmate has no right to counsel
in disciplinary proceedings. That holding notwithstanding, where the issues are com-
[Vol. 66
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cording to the complexity of the case, there would be no poten-
tial equal protection discrimination against indigent parole
applicants who could not afford the benefits of counsel." The
main disadvantage would be the fact that the discretion would
again rest with the parole board to decide whether counsel is
needed. The danger is that the board, as a state agency, may
lean in favor of efficiency and economy, to the detriment of the
prisoner whose case requires the aid of counsel. Assuming the
board would consider all requests for counsel without being
overly influenced by the state budget or the additional burden
on the board's case load, there still would be the necessity of a
preliminary determination as to the complexity of the case and
the prisoner's capabilities, a determination which might lead
to an informal decision on the merits before the applicant has
even had an opportunity to speak.
The parole applicant's right to counsel must be molded to
the particular situation by weighing the conflicting needs of the
state and the individual. The prisoner's due process interests
and the goal of accurate factfinding can be furthered without
significantly burdening the state by requiring prior notice and
access to files; the right to submit a written statement and
rebut adverse evidence before the board; and the requirement
of written reasons for denial of parole. The obligation of the
state to provide every indigent parole applicant with counsel
to represent him during his hearing would be unnecessary in
clear-cut cases. Nevertheless, the state should provide all pris-
oners with some type of legal aid in preparing their applica-
tions, either from the staff or a legal services program. A care-
fully prepared written statement submitted before the hearing
would facilitate the interview and lessen the need for counsel
during the hearing. If the parole board considered the pris-
oner's request for counsel during the hearing justifiable, it
could allow retained or appointed counsel to appear in a lim-
ited manner, as in the federal parole system." Given the right
to submit a prior written statement, the restriction of counsel's
plex and the prisoner is unable to present his evidence effectively, he may obtain
assistance from other inmates or as provided by the staff. 418 U.S. at 570.
" Cf. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (if state grants statutory right to
first appeal, then the indigent appellant has a right to appointed counsel).
11 28 C.F.R. § 2.12(b) (1976).
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function to supplying additional information and presenting a
concluding statement during the prisoner's hearing would meet
the applicant's need for effective representation without un-
necessarily obstructing the proceedings or hindering the
board's decisionmaking discretion.
CONCLUSION
In the past, courts have been reluctant to enter the area
of parole release decisions because of deference to the parens
patriae concept, the idea that the state's paternal relationship
with the prisoner made due process safeguards unnecessary."
The parole board was not considered part of the criminal pro-
cess, but rather as having a rehabilitative and predictive func-
tion. Thus it was necessary for the board to develop a "special
expertise" involving many non-legal considerations99 that
" The parens patriae (parent of the country) concept involves the sovereign power
of the state to act as guardian for those individuals with legal disabilities. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1269 (4th ed. 1968).
" 501 Ky. ADMIN. REG. 1:010 § 9 (1976) states:
In reaching their decision, the board shall consider:
(1) Current offense;
(2) Prior record;
(3) Institutional adjustment and conduct:
(a) Disciplinary reports,
(b) Loss of good time,
(c) Work and program involvement.
(4) Attitude toward authority:
(a) Before incarceration,
(b) During incarceration.
(5) History of alcohol or drug involvement;
(6) History of prior probation, shock probation or parole violations;
(7) Educational and job skills;




(12) History of deviant behavior;
(13) Official and community attitudes toward accepting inmate back in the
county of conviction;
(14) Review of parole plan:
(a) Housing,
(b) Employment,
(c) Need for community treatment and follow-up resources such
as: 1. Halfway houses and residential treatment centers,
2. Comprehensive care centers,
3. Service centers,
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would be hindered by the intrusion of adversary criminal pro-
cedures. Because both state and prisoner were considered to
have a "unity of interest" in rehabilitation, there was no need
for procedural safeguards."'0
However, the parens patriae concept cannot justify the
absolute discretion to make a decision which will significantly
affect an individual's liberty.' In the area of juvenile proceed-
ings, the Supreme Court rejected the parens patriae rationale
as an impermissible barrier to due process, stating: "[U]n-
bridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is fre-
quently a poor substitute for principle and procedure.""0 In-
stead of blindly deferring to the state, courts should take a
new look at the realistic concept of parole-its effect on the
prisoner's liberty and its integral part within the penological
system today.
Parole release is no longer an act of clemency granted to a
few well-behaved inmates. It is a prevalent rehabilitative mea-
sure that reintegrates prisoners into society. 0 3 In 1970 seventy-
4. Individual counselling with private social agencies
and private treatment resources such as psychiatrists
and psychologists.
(15) Any other factors involved that would relate to the inmate's needs and
the safety of the public.
'" O'Leary & Nuffield, supra note 40, at 653. The federal district court, relying
on the need to give parole boards total discretion, dismissed petitioner Scott's action.
"[T]he nature of this 'practical and troublesome area' demands that the states be left
free to develop correctional remedies unhampered by pervasive judicial interference in
the mechanics of conditional release." Bell v. Kentucky Parole Bd. (E.D. Ky., filed
Mar. 15, 1974) (memorandum opinion).
101 Project, supra note 43, at 847.
' In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 (1967). The Court went on to say:
The absence of substantive standards has not necessarily meant that
children receive careful, compassionate, individualized treatment. The ab-
sence of procedural rules based upon constitutional principle has not always
produced fair, efficient, and effective procedures. Departures from estab-
lished principles of due process have frequently resulted not in enlightened
procedure, but in arbitrariness.
Id. at 18-19.
'0 During the past 60 years, the practice of releasing prisoners 'on
parole before the end of their sentences has become an integral part of the
penological system ... .Rather than being an ad hoc exercise of clemency,
parole is an established variation on imprisonment of convicted criminals.
Its purpose is to help individuals reintegrate into society as constructive
individuals as soon as they are able. . . .It also serves to alleviate the costs
to society of keeping an individual in prison.
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972).
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two percent of the felons released from prison were released on
parole.' °4 Furthermore, the significance of parole release is not
limited to the penal system. The availability of parole is viewed
by most judges as a relevant factor in the sentencing of prison-
ers. ' As a realistic matter, the parole board itself effectively
acts as a sentencing judge, for actual determination of how long
the prisoner remains in confinement is ultimately decided by
the parole board.' 5
Thus the parole board wields a significant power over the
prisoner's liberty, a power that is virtually unchecked by the
courts. In Kentucky the law states, "The orders of the board
shall not be reviewable except as to compliance with the terms
of [the parole act]."'' 0 Yet there are no specific provisions for
review within the act. Judicial review has been held available
only where the parole board's decision is so clearly arbitrary as
to be an abuse of discretion.10 The parole release process has
been described as "the single most inequitable, potentially
capricious, and uniquely arbitrary corner of the criminal jus-
tice map.""'
Yet the absence of due process safeguards leaves the de-
nied applicant with no avenue to review and no way to prove
an abuse of discretion by the parole board. The frustration
and hostility that inevitably result only work to thwart the
chief purpose of parole-rehabilitation." A reevaluation of the
,"I Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 23.
'0 Of those judges responding to the survey, 88% regularly considered the availa-
bility of parole as a factor in sentencing. Project, supra note 43, at 882 n.361.
0I Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 32.
,01 KRS § 439.330(3) (1975). See also Willard v. Ferguson, 358 S.W.2d 516 (Ky.
1962).
0 Brown v. Lundgren, 528 F.2d 1050, 1055 (5th Cir.) (2-1 decision), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 917 (1976). An even more extreme view is found in Ornitz v. Robuck, 366 F.
Supp. 183, 184 (E.D. Ky. 1973), in which the court stated that the sole discretion of
the parole board was unreviewable since parole applicants had no procedural rights.
" Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 20. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-184, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1975)).
"I While the board acts favorably in most cases, it engenders hostility
because of the inconsistency of its rationale. Some inmates who have had
good behavior records in prison are "hit" (denied parole), while others with
many infractions are granted parole. Some inmates with a long record of
prior offenses may receive parole, while others, including first offenders, may
be denied it. Nobody gives the inmate an explanation for these obviously
inconsistent decisions or describes in anything more than meaningless gener-
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modern concept of parole is long overdue. The legislatures have
provided only vague statutory guidelines, leaving parole boards
with virtually unchecked discretion. It is time courts take the
necessary steps to protect the prisoner's right to a fair consider-
ation of parole and to force some degree of order within the
parole release decision.
Donna Chu
alities the criteria used by the board in arriving at its decisions. . . . As a
result, inmates are left to speculate among themselves as to the reasons for
the board's decisions. Corruption and chance are among the favorite inmate
speculations.
ArrCA: THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE N.Y. STATE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON ArrIcA 97
(1972), quoted in United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of
Parole, 500 F.2d 925, 932 n.6 (2d Cir. 1974).
* Author's Note. Upon remand from the United States Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has decided the question of mootness in Bell
v. Kentucky Parole Bd., 556 F.2d 805 (6th Cir. 1977). In a per curiam order the court
dismissed as moot the appeal of Calvin Bell, who had died. The court determined
however that the issues were not moot as to appellant Scott for several reasons. First,
even if the appellant obtains parole, the Kentucky Parole Board may execute the
detainer issued against him. (Although Scott had been released on parole at the time
of the remand to the Sixth Circuit, the court's opinion indicates that Scott is not on
parole at present and will not become eligible for parole until June 1978). Furthermore,
the rules and regulations in effect at the time of the complaint have not been revised,
nor are any relevant changes expected soon. Finally, it is probable that Scott will be
subject to Kentucky's parole system again in the future. Having determined that
Scott's appeal is not moot, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal
of the complaint on the grounds that there was no violation of the plaintiff's constitu-
tional rights.
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